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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e)
(2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct

an adequate

inquiry

into Mr. Briggs objection

that

the plea

agreement had been violated by the State's recommendation for
prison.

This constitutes a question of law reviewed by the

appellate court for correctness.

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

935-36 (Utah 1994) .

Preservation

of Issue Citation

or Statement

of Grounds for

Review.

Mr. Briggs preserved this issue by way of his objection set forth
at R. 54:7:16-21.
2.
motion

Whether to the extent that there was no affirmative
for a withdrawal

of

the guilty plea, appointed

trial

counsel denied Mr. Briggs of his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective

assistance of counsel.

To make such a showing, a

defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was
prejudicial.

Bundy

v.

DeLand,

763 P.2d 803

1

(Utah 1988).

The

appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law.
Robertson,

2006 UT App 419, f5; State v. Maestas,

984 P.2d 376; State v.

Strain,

State

v.

1999 UT 32, f20,

885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App.

1994).

Preservation
Issues

of Issue Citation

involving

claims

of

or Statement
ineffective

of Grounds for Review:
assistance

of

counsel

constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the violation of a plea agreement by the
State.

The State's violation of the plea agreement denied Mr.

Briggs, as the Defendant, of his constitutional

right to due

process and of his benefit of the bargain negotiated with the
State.
Mr. Briggs was charged with one count of Possession or Use of
a

Controlled

Substance

(Prior),

a

second-degree

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
2

felony,

in

Thereafter, Mr.

Briggs appeared before the district court pursuant to a negotiated
plea and pleaded guilty "as charged, State will stipulate to a
double 4 02 per statute if

[D]efendant is granted & completes

probation without any violations; otherwise silent at sentencing."
The district court ordered that a presentence investigation report
be prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P).
During the initial sentencing hearing held on June 30, 2005,
the court granted appointed trial counsel's motion for continuance
for further investigation of a sentencing alterative.

At the

subsequent sentencing hearing on July 7, 2 005, based upon the
conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior),
a second-degree felony, the court sentenced Mr. Briggs "to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison."

Mr. Briggs, through appointed

appellate counsel, appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Briggs was charged with one count of Possession or

Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i)

(R. 1-2).

See

Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum A.

3

2.
court

On May 26, 2005, Mr. Briggs appeared before the district

pursuant

to

a negotiated

plea

and

pleaded

guilty

"as

charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per statute if
[D]efendant

is

granted

&

completes

probation

violations; otherwise silent at sentencing."

without

(R. 20-24).

any
See

Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate
of Counsel, R. 2 0-24, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum B; R. 56:2:9-16.
3.

The

district

court

ordered

that

a

presentence

investigation report be prepared by Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P) (R. 16; R. 18; R. 56:4:21-24).
4.

At the initial sentencing hearing held on June 30, 2005,

appointed trial counsel, surprised by AP&P's recommendation of
prison,

moved

the

sentencing

court

for

a

continuance

to

investigate an alternative to AP&P's recommendation of prison (R.
55:2-3).

The

court

granted

the

motion

and

scheduled

the

sentencing hearing for July 7, 2005 (R. 30-31) .
5.

During the subsequent

sentencing hearing on July 7,

2 0 05, appointed trial counsel argued that Mr. Briggs be given an
opportunity to be evaluated and screened for acceptance by the Job
Corp program to enable Mr. Briggs to develop necessary job skills
(R. 54:2-5) .

4

6.

The State then disputed Mr. Briggs' Job Corp request,

arguing that Job Corp, as a treatment program, was inappropriate
because Mr. Briggs is a high-risk individual who would

"just

reoffend." (R. 54:6-7) .
7.

Appointed

trial

counsel

objected,

arguing

that

the

State's comments violated the plea agreement by constituting a
"back-door recommendation for prison." (R. 54:7:16-21).
8.

Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a

Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, the district
court, without further discussion of the plea agreement, sentenced
Mr. Briggs "to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison" (R. 32-33) .

See

Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 32-33, a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Addendum C.
9.

The

district

court

signed

the

Sentence,

Judgment,

Commitment on July 13, 2005, but, according to the docket, it was
entered on July 7, 2005 (R. 32-33).
10.

Mr. Briggs, through appointed appellate counsel, filed

a timely Notice of Appeal on August 5, 2005 (R. 37-40) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an

adequate inquiry into Mr. Briggs objection that the plea agreement

5

had been violated by the State's recommendation for prison.

The

record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally violated
the plea agreement by not remaining silent at sentencing and
instead substantially and affirmatively making a recommendation
for prison.

In light of the United

holding in Santobello

State's

Supreme

Court's

and the subsequent Utah case law addressing

Mr. Briggs' entitlement that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea, the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry concerning

the State's alleged violation of the plea

agreement.
2.

To the extent that there was no affirmative motion for

a withdrawal of the guilty plea, appointed trial counsel denied
Mr.

Briggs

of

his

Sixth

assistance of counsel.
failing

to

Amendment

right

to

the

effective

But for counsel's unprofessional error of

affirmatively

request

that

the

sentencing

court

withdraw or set aside the guilty plea, the result at sentencing
would have been different.

Had the sentencing court been so moved

upon, it more likely than not would have duly and more carefully
considered the State's violation of the plea agreement, which, in
turn, would have demonstrated Mr. Briggs' entitlement to have the
guilty plea withdrawn.

6

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO MR, BRIGGS
OBJECTION THAT THE PLEA AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
VIOLATED BY THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION FOR
PRISON.

" [A]

constant

factor

is that

when

a plea

rests

in any

significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
Santobello

such promise must be fulfilled."

257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

v. New York,

404 U.S.

"It is well established that

a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a guilty plea and
then refuse to keep those promises."

State

v.

Copeland,

765 P.2d

1266, 1275 (Utah 1988) .
In Santobello
495, 498-99

v. New York,

404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct.

(1971), the United States Supreme Court "expressly

recognized that, as a matter of due process, a defendant who
pleads guilty has a constitutional right to a remedy when that
agreement is broken."
1986) .

State

v.

Kay,

The prosecutor, in Santobello,

111

P.2d 12 94, 13 06 (Utah

promised not to make any

recommendations concerning the defendant's sentence in return for
the defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense than with which he
had been charged.

Santobello,

404 U.S. at 258, 92 S.Ct. at 497.

The prosecutor failed to keep that promise.

Even though the

prosecutor's recommendation of a maximum one-year sentence did not
7

influence the sentencing judge, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for either a withdrawal of the plea
or specific enforcement of the agreement on the plea.

Id.

at 262-

63, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
Utah law follows the Santobello
Garfield,

552 P.2d 129

precedent.

In State

v.

(Utah 1976), the prosecutor promised to

recommend probation for the defendant to the sentencing judge.
Id.

at 130.

On appeal, the defendant

argued that the State

violated the plea bargain agreement because it had not fulfilled
its promise to recommend probation.

Id.

at 129.

The Utah Supreme

Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the recommendation had been included in the probation
report.

Id.

at 131.

More pointedly, the court held that if the

recommendation had not been included, the defendant was "entitled
to have his sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the
benefit of his bargain."
In State

v.

Kay,

Id.

at 130.

111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme

Court, in the course of examining the possible double jeopardy
implications of a broken plea agreement, stated:
If the . . . prosecutor refused to comply
with the terms of the plea [after it is
entered and accepted], the defendant may
choose to withdraw the plea . . . .
[0]nce
the court or prosecution has entered into a
plea agreement and that plea has been
accepted
and
entered,
neither one may

8

unilaterally withdraw from the agreement
without a showing that facts analogous to
those warranting a mistrial exist (at least
in the absence of a breach of the agreement
by the defendant).
Copeland,

765 P.2d at 1276

(quoting Kay,

111

P.2d at 1304)

(alterations included).
In the instant case, Mr. Briggs appeared before the district
court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and pleaded guilty
"as charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per statute if
[D]efendant

is

granted

violations;

otherwise

&
[the

sentencing." (R. 2 0-24).

completes
State

probation

will

without

remain]

silent

any
at

See Statement of Defendant in Support of

Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, R. 20-24, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.; see
R.

56:2:9-16.

The

court

then

ordered

that

also

a presentence

investigation report be prepared by AP&P.
At the initial sentencing hearing, appointed trial counsel,
who was surprised by AP&P's recommendation of prison, moved the
sentencing court for a continuance to investigate an alternative
to recommendation of prison.

The court granted the motion and

scheduled the sentencing for a week later.
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, appointed trial counsel
enthusiastically argued that the court provide Mr. Briggs with the
opportunity to be evaluated and screened for acceptance by the Job
9

Corp program to enable Mr. Briggs to develop necessary job skills.
In response, the State disputed Mr. Briggs' Job Corp request,
arguing that Job Corp, as a treatment program, was inappropriate
because Mr. Briggs is a high-risk individual who would "just
reoffend."
Appointed trial counsel objected, arguing that the State's
comments violated the plea agreement by constituting a "back-door
recommendation for prison."

Without further discussion regarding

the plea agreement violation, the sentencing judge

sentenced Mr.

Briggs to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally
violated the plea agreement by not remaining silent at sentencing
and instead substantially making a recommendation for prison.
light of Santobello

In

and the subsequent case law addressing Mr.

Briggs' entitlement that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea, the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry concerning the State's alleged violation of the plea
agreement.
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II.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS NO AFFIRMATIVE
MOTION FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF THE GUILTY PLEA#
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. BRIGGS OF
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2 064.

Id.

at 687, 104

This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundy

v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v.
P.2d

1113, 1119

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

v.

Wright,

Perry,

893

" [T] he right to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair
sentencing.

Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.

838, 842, (1993).

x

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that Mi]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
11

To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
'show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness."'

State

(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

fell

below

v. Templin,

an

objective

805 P.2d 182, 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct.

at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

A defendant must ''overcome

the

counsel

strong

presumption

that

trial

rendered

adequate

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

v.

497

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

reasonable probability

sufficient

that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

"a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,
U

805 P.2d

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
1994); State

v.

Frame,

v. Barnes,

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

Appointed trial counsel, in the instant case, objected to the
State's failure to remain silent and its recommendation made at
sentencing.

However, to the extent that appointed trial counsel

failed to follow-up the objection with an affirmative motion to
12

withdraw or set aside the guilty plea, he arguably waived the
right of Mr. Briggs to have the sentencing court duly consider
such a motion.

Appointed trial counsel's failure fell below an

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.

This is

demonstrated by existing Utah case law, as previously discussed,
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

77-13-6,2

and

the

underlying

factual

circumstances of this case.
But

for

counsel's

unprofessional

error

of

failing

to

affirmatively request that the sentencing court withdraw or set
aside the guilty plea, the result at sentencing would have been
different.

Had the sentencing court been so moved upon, it more

likely than not would have duly and more carefully considered the
State's violation of the plea agreement, which, in turn, would
have demonstrated Mr. Briggs' entitlement to have the guilty plea
withdrawn.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Briggs respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of whether Mr. Briggs desires to have

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 provides, in relevant part, that " [a]
request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion
before sentence is announced . . . ."
13

the guilty plea withdrawn and for further proceedings consistent
with this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (Q

day of January, 2006.

ARNC)tB\& WIGGINS, P.C,

Scott L) Wigleys

14

pellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this (p
day of
January, 2 006:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 14 085^
Salt Lake/5ity,"^T\ 84\14-0854
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Tab A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P. O. Box 618
800 West State Street
FarmingtonUT 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328

SECOND DIS1WC1 L'GURl

2085 APR 2 0 A l t * t < 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS
DOB: 09/20/1982,
Defendant.

Bail:
INFORMATION
Case No.

OTN17058850

TC-Y

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, on or about April 19, 2005 at County of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crime of:
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (581)
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant, having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance, to wit:
Methamphetamine.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Patrick Swain.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Patrick
Swain of the Layton Police Department, and the information herein is based upon such personal
observations and investigation of said officer.

On April 19, 2005 the defendant was searched incident to an arrest on a warrant.
Upon searching the defendant, the police officer found a baggie containing a substance that
^

tested positive for methamphetamine.

The defendant has been twice before convicted of

A3

*

possession of a controlled substance.
Authorized April 20, 2005
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN<fWILSON
Davis bounty Attorn

Deputy Davis County Attorney

TabB

MAY 2? 2005
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDlfclAL D i s i ^ ^ / o "
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STAm43EK§ffl!CTCOURT
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS
Defendant.

Case No.

6*^0006^

I, BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and
that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s):

Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

P&CP"

sfi^i~8U\&V,i

Y

B

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to
me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime(s)
:rime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are:

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty plea and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guiltvi and <

On April 19, 2005 the defendant was searched incident to an arrest on a warrant. Upon searching
the defendant, the police officer found a baggie containing a substance that tested positive for
methamphetamine. The defendant has been twice before convicted of possession of a controlled
substance.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the
following rights:
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) ^are^waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea.
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
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My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty plea.
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial,
(a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney,
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the
witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I
chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear., the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one
could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify,
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am
presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have tofindme guilty.
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I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting
that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State
would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I
plead guilty.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and
constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which
I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a
prison term,fine,or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved,
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the courtfindsand states
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting
attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this
statement, including those explained below:
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this
statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
am
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grade. I can read and
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me.
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or
impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must move to withdraw my plea before
my sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show it was not knowingly
and voluntarily made.
Dated this

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, the defendant above, and that I
know defendant has read the statement or that I have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with
defendant and believe that defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated;
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.
4*-
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against BRANDON JAMES
BRIGGS, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations
are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea is entered and that the acceptance of the plea would serve
the public interest.

PROSECUTION ATTORNEY
Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that
the defendant's guilty plea isfreely,knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime(s) set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.
^
Dated this J ^ ^ d a y of
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2nd District - Farmington COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 051700620 FS

BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS,
Defendant.
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

DARWIN C. HANSEN
Julv 7, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
glendap
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): UTZINGER, TODD A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 20, 1982
Video
Tape Number:
7/7/05
Tape Count: 10.04
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/26/2005 Guilty
HEARING
The defendant to pay a $500 Public Defender Fee.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the DAVIS County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your

Case No: 051700620
Date:
Jul 07, 2005
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Dated this / ^

day of

District Court Judge

